This article evaluates whether the changing presence of foreign firms in India's corporate sector has had an impact on the long-run economic performance of India's industrial sector. The patterns of corporate demography, including the role of foreign firms, in India over the last five decades, from the 1950s to the 2000s are traced and then related to a measure of economic performance calculated as productive efficiency indices for all of Indian industry for the period from 1957-58 to 2001-02. The results show a strong relationship between the growing presence of foreign firms in India and the productive efficiency of Indian industry. The notion that foreign firms' capabilities can spillover to other sectors of industry finds support, and an increase in foreign firms' presence is also associated with an enhancement of the ability of Indian industry to utilize its managerial human capital effectively. In the period after reforms commenced in 1991, the number of foreign firms operating in India has increased substantially. Thus, foreign firms are interested in becoming an increasing presence in the Indian economy, with positive performance consequences expected from such increased participation. So far, basic property rights changes have had significant effects on providing incentives for foreign firms to operate in India and the automatic availability of such property rights has been a major factor that affects the motivation of foreign firms to set up operations in India. Yet, the government gave veto rights to the Indian private sector on certain aspects of the entry of foreign firms into India by promulgating Press Note 18 in late 1998, repealed in early 2005, and it is difficult to speculate on either the precise numbers of foreign companies that were scared off by this note or the loss of performance accompanying the absence of foreign firms from Indian industry.
INTRODUCTION

The Background
The Indian attitude to foreign investment has been ambiguous. Perhaps as a hangover of the colonial past, during which substantial national wealth and economic resources were indeed lost to the West, there has been wariness as to what types of foreign firms can operate in India. Coupled with Indian intelligentsia's rapid absorption of anti-multinational company (MNC) views, fuelled no doubt in part by examples such as ITT in Allende's Chile and latterly Enron, there still remains a strong ground swell against the presence of foreign firms in India.
Whether this implicit Indian psyche makes its way via osmosis into the minds of negotiators or not, in the present day and age India has barely managed a few billion dollars a year as foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The sums hovered around the $1 billion mark for several years, and there has been very positive sentiments expressed that in 2004 the sums were around the $3.7 billion mark, though the economy can easily absorb ten times that amount. For country with a fifth of the world's people, one that ranks high on FDI outlook indices, and one that is supposed to be one of the great global powers in the foreseeable future, the annual sum received is trivial; in fact it is less than 1 percent given that global annual FDI flows are in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and China alone receives over $50 billion per year. In addition, FDI in India accounts for less than 5 percent of all investments.
Nevertheless, India has had a long history of foreign investment. After 1900, and particularly between 1919 and 1947, there had been a considerable increase in Indian entrepreneurship (Bagchi, 1972) . At independence the predominant share of capital in industry was foreign-owned (Kidron, 1965) and India was host to a large body of foreign capital, principally British. As a characteristic of colonial heritage, foreign investments were concentrated in extractive industries; for example, 85 percent of the area planted to tea was foreign-owned. Another area of concentration was international trade and ancillary services. Foreign units were also the largest and most influential in any industry that they participated in. Kidron (1965) documents that the average foreign-owned cotton mill employed 3,300 workers, as compared to 1,800 by an Indian-owned mill. Also, as late as 1951-1952 39 per cent of India's imports and between 37 and 44 per cent of India's exports were handled by foreign firms.
From the 1950s, however, the policy thrust was on detailed centralized planning and the role of the state as the premier catalyst of industrial development was codified in industrial policy statements and resolutions (Jalan, 1991) . While Indian industrial development progressed via the organizational mechanisms of both public and private sector enterprises, the role of foreign capital diminished and there were significant capital reparations. After 1947 there were continuing sales of British interests to Indian entrepreneurs. While in 1938 there were 61 large business-groups controlled by the British, by 1962 no more than 25 business-groups remained British (Kidron, 1965) .
A particular phenomenon, observable after the mid-1950s, was the growth in government owned enterprises. In 1948 an Industrial Policy Resolution was passed by which government sought control of industrialization, and this was to be achieved through the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951. The role of the state as an industrial entrepreneur and manager was clearly articulated, and this articulation of ideas was consistent with the industrial development model being adopted in the Western European countries at that time. However, if private firms existed in certain industries where the state was to assume a dominant role, these firms had freedom for efficient production and expansion.
In 1956 a second Industrial Policy Resolution was enunciated. This resolution then guided industrial policy-making in India for well over a quarter of a century. The principle that the state was to be the dominant industrializer was maintained and the resolution precisely operationalized the nature of public ownership. While private firms were likely to be occasionally authorized to produce items which were reserved for the state sector, the state sector could enter at will into sectors where private firms were dominant players. The second Industrial Policy Resolution coincided with the launch of the Second Five Year Plan in India, an event which while it decisively channeled resources to the industrial sector also explicitly put in place a mind-set whereby the evolution of the economy was to be guided by conscious human action and choices that were to be made in the New Delhi secretariat. It was the time when the commanding heights argument was clearly articulated.
Two factors shaping the corporate landscape of India in the past half century have been the relative decline of foreign firms and the growth of government firms. In a sense, the implicit mind set has been one of autarky. The closing of the economy to external capital and the substitution of private domestic capital by government capital were the instruments. The decline in the role of foreign firms in India was further exacerbated by the introduction of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973. While promulgated after the hike in oil prices, to save foreign exchange which was needed to pay for critical imports such as food and petroleum, at the same time the maximum shareholding that foreign firms could have in Indian companies was limited to 40 percent. This was so that outflows repatriated to foreign owners could be minimized. Nevertheless, the consequences were dysfunctional. As an American businessman remarked, at a meeting with the then Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi (Das, 2002:199) : "My issue, Madam Prime Minister, is with the government's insistence on limiting foreign ownership in companies to 40 percent. Consequently, multinational companies have lost interest in India. And your country is neither getting investment nor technology."
The change of government in 1977 brought together a coalition of political partners which had ambiguous attitudes towards foreign firms. Firms such as IBM and Coca-Cola were given marching orders out of India, while firms such as Siemens and Bechtel were welcomed with open arms. The rules limiting foreign ownership to only 40 percent continued for almost two decades and were finally eliminated in 1991, after the reforms were introduced, and there has been a resurgence of entrepreneurial activity in India after that date. Not only has domestic entrepreneurship expanded substantially, but foreign firms have also started to make investments in India once again. Simultaneously, a policy of privatization has been adopted which, while not implemented in a comprehensive manner, recognizes the need for a performance transformation of firms that are in public ownership. A substantial evolution in the progress of Indian industry is taking place after the 1991 reforms, and this progress builds on the pattern of evolution put in place in the mid-1950s.
The Core Issue Evaluated
A substantial literature (for instance, Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1993; Helpman, 1984; Hymer, 1976) has highlighted the contours of theoretical concerns showing that foreign firms' performance is superior relative to that of other firms within an economy. A key view is that foreign firms have superior capabilities which lead them to become international players in the first place (Caves, 1996) . They possess international marketing capabilities, location advantages in other countries, a global operations network and in-depth knowledge of foreign markets (de la Torre, 1974) . They also have the ability to manage the international political economy dimension (Helleiner, 1988) . These ideas find their support in the dynamic capabilities view of the firm that is extant in the management literature, and in contemporary endogenous growth theory.
In fact, Caves (1996) explicitly articulates the view that firms' motives for overseas forays, and successes, are significantly predicated upon the possession of intangible assets. Successful firms making overseas investments possess substantial intangible assets. The ownership of these assets serves to enhance the competencies and capabilities that firms possess, and the availability of a stock of capabilities helps firm leverage these in environmental contexts other than that of the parent country. A major form of an intangible asset is marketing skills. A firm can possess skills in activities such as branding, distribution, merchandising and promotion such that its product is clearly distinguishable and delivered to the apposite market segment. Another marketing advantage arises because a foreign firm may operate in several different markets around the world. Such assets are productive as they generate a price premium for the product in question since buyers are willing to pay more than for other comparable products or services.
Intangible assets include the availability of superior technologies. These can take the form of patented designs or processes, or manufacturing or research know-how shared among a critical mass of employees. The experiences of the human capital pool that a firm has access to gives it the ability to exploit market opportunities, using the technologies that are superior, at least for the time being. These assets, when deployed in a domestic firm in an emerging market economy which has relatively low wage levels, but an educated work force, then also help give foreign firms decided manufacturing and production cost advantages. This attribute makes their products competitive and leads to relatively superior performance compared to other firms that operate in the same environment. A question that arises is would not India have been better off by promoting and increasing the presence of foreign enterprises within its industrial sector?
Contours of the Present Study
Using a data base put together from the records of the Department of Company Affairs (DCA) of the Government of India, in this article I first trace the patterns of corporate demography in India over the last five decades, from the 1950s to the 2000s, and then, using time series regression techniques, evaluate whether the changing presence of foreign firms in India's corporate sector has had an impact on the long-run economic performance of India's industrial sector. Corporate demography as a field deals with the big picture issue of the evolution of the populations of firms and industries, and their impact on various parameters of economic performance such as productivity or employment (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) . The article is cast within that framework to evaluate the role of foreign firms in India.
The DCA data base is a comprehensive population level coverage of the numbers of various types of companies that make up India's corporate sector and the data are available for several decades in a time series. Using an operational research technique, I measure economic performance as productive efficiency of Indian industry, using another comprehensive data base, one put together by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) as the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to do so. The DCA and ASI data both cover the period from 1957-58 to 2001-02 and permit an evaluation of industrial performance over five decades. These also permit an economy-wide analysis. Interpretations of the roles that various types of companies or firms, the term firm is used interchangeably with companies, have played in the past half a century within the Indian economy are possible.
Capital, whether technological, organizational, human or intellectual, has been expressed as the source of productivity and that of the wealth of nations (de Soto, 2000) . Such reasoning has to be taken a step further. Productive efficiency, in a dynamic perspective, is the most significant measure of economic performance, since a continuing high level of productivity eventually provides the financial outcomes from undertaking any economic activity and the wherewithal that helps make further capital investments possible. It is the implicitly unobservable, but explicitly measurable, link between the primary investment of capital, on one hand, and the generation of further capital surpluses, on the other.
The issue explored in this paper is whether the presence of foreign firms in the Indian economy has been positively associated with productivity of industry as a whole over the past five decades. This is also a standard question in the literature on spillovers, dealing with the efficacy of the presence of different forms of investments within the context of an economy, on which there is a substantial amount of recent evidence (see Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 1996; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; and Gorg and Strobl, 2001 ). Nevertheless, this evidence is at best ambiguous and equivocal for several countries of the world. For India, an evaluation of the pharmaceutical sector has revealed positive spillovers, but not for the industry in question as a whole (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001) . If the long run presence of foreign firms in the Indian economy has been positively associated with productive efficiency, then the attitudes towards FDI may well deserve a rethinking.
Empirical Analysis
As remarked above, there are two sources of data that are used for the analyses in this article. A set of evidence showing the growth of the corporate sector, in both absolute terms and relative terms, is generated using data that are obtained from the DCA, a department that specifically is interested in the corporate sector of India as a whole. Their data is at the company or corporate level. They do not, however, look after the interests of businesses that are organized either as a proprietorship, a partnership or a cooperative. Nevertheless, firms organized as corporations account for almost ninety percent of the value of industrial output in India. The second set of data used are generated by the ASI, which is an activity carried out by the CSO.
The DCA data are organized as a time-series for the period 1957-58 to 2001-02, and contains details on: the number of foreign companies in India; the number of domestic private companies in India; the number of government companies in India; and the total number of companies in India. Details are also provided on companies belonging to the not for profit sector, which are very limited in number, and these form the base case left out for subsequent regression analysis so that the matrix is not singular. The data covers the entire population of enterprises making up the corporate sector in India. These data provide a full picture of the evolution of India's corporate economy for almost five decades. These have been the critical post-war and for India post-independence decades when the basic structure of India's economy and society were being developed.
From these data, it is possible to calculate the following ratios that become relevant for carrying out further analyses: (a) the proportion of foreign companies, as defined under Section 591 of the Companies Act 1956, to the total number of companies corporate sector as a whole; (b) the proportion of domestic private companies to the total number of companies in the corporate sector as a whole; and (c) the proportion of government companies to the total number of companies in the corporate sector as a whole. These statistics provide the overall picture on the evolution of the industrial structure of India for over a forty five year period. The total number of observations used, within a time series framework, is forty four, however, since the ASI data were not released for 1972-73. Since extensive time series data are available, it is possible to calculate the period-to-period changes for each of the variables so that the impact of the changing presence of a variety of firms can be evaluated.
The article unfolds as follows. In section 2 I provide details of the corporate demography of India and discuss the trends that have been noted. In section 3 I discuss the analysis of productive efficiency that are carried out and the results that are obtained. The procedure also generates measures of the latent competencies that are prevalent within the Indian industrial sector. In this section I also highlight the relationships between the different types of firms analyzed and the different competencies that are latent within Indian industry. In section 4 I discuss the implications of the findings and the contours of the changing policy mind set in India. I also highlight some policy changes that are required in order to keep attracting foreign investment. In section 5 I sum up the article.
THE CORPORATE DEMOGRAPHY OF INDIA
The Basic Facts
The approach that I take in this article is to highlight the demography of India's corporate sector, in a relatively straightforward way, and first describe the different patterns of growth displayed by three types of firms that are important within the context being evaluated: foreign firms, private domestic firms and government firms. In a sense, this part of the article is a counting exercise, as in most corporate demography work, wherein I use the data and the trends to describe and discuss the relative composition of India's corporate sector over a fifty year period. Table 1 provides details of the basic statistics. *********************** INSERT TABLE 1 HERE *********************** Table 1 shows the average number of foreign, domestic private and government firms within India's corporate sector for the overall period 1957-58 to 2001-02. The average numbers in total, for each category, may not provide as much insights as the proportions that each category bears to the whole. The proportion of foreign firms in India is less than 1 percent of India's firms but their share has ranged from a high of accounting for 2.127 percent of all firms in India to accounting for a low of 0.165 percent of all firms in India. Clearly, there has been a substantial rise and fall in the proportion of foreign firms within India's corporate economy. The lowest number of foreign firms was 300 while the maximum number is 1,141.
From a review of the latter half of the table, it is clear that the domestic private enterprise is the dominant type of enterprise in the Indian industrial landscape, at least in numbers. They have accounted for, in the period as a whole, 95 percent of India's companies but again the minimum and maximum values have ranged from 93 percent to over 98 percent. The upper half of the table shows that at one point the lowest number of domestic private firms in India was 24,821 but the maximum number of domestic private Indian firms has grown to 567,834. Very clearly, there has been substantial growth in the number of domestic private enterprises in India. This growth is evaluated statistically in a subsequent section.
In line with the growth of domestic private firms in India has been the growth of government owned firms. While accounting for less than 1 percent of India's corporate sector for the entire period assessed, with a low of 0.22 percent and a high of just under 1.5 percent of India's firms, their numbers have grown from 74 to 1,266 in the five decades. While this impressive growth in the number of companies is not as robust as that of the growth of the number of domestic private firms in India, it is considerably greater than that of the growth in the number of foreign firms. Also, government owned firms have accounted for, at one stage, the bulk of the capital invested in industry (Majumdar, 1998) .
Data on the amount of capital invested by foreign companies are not available but evidence has been generated showing that foreign companies account for between a quarter and third of sales in India's manufacturing sector (Athreya and Kapur, 2001 ). On the whole, foreign firms have accounted for a relatively larger proportion of India's corporate landscape in numbers relative to government companies, but the growth in numbers of government companies in India has been more pronounced. This finding is at keeping with the pro-public sector and anti-foreign firm attitude that has characterized Indian policy making for a substantial portion of the five decades.
Trends in the Growth of the Different Types of Firms
While the above discussion has dealt with the big picture, a more interesting line of analysis revolves around an assessment of the trends on a year-by-year basis. These trends are easily assessed using figures, and figure 1 shows the actual numbers of foreign and government companies in existence and in operation in India for all of the years studied. In figure 1 I compare the annual trends in the numbers of both foreign and government companies. These companies are numerically not a substantial part of the Indian corporate economy, but in terms of capital investments and sales generated are large. *********************** INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE *********************** Figure 1 shows that there were, on average, 568 foreign companies operating in India from 1957 India from -58 to 1972 , the year before FERA was promulgated. Policies towards foreign firms were not illiberal. After that year, with the introduction of the draconian 40 percent foreign ownership limit, the number of foreign companies operating in India went down steadily till the early 1980s. In the 1977 to 1979 period there had been substantial confusion over the role of foreign companies' operations in India. Coca-Cola and IBM, on their refusal to dilute their ownership holdings from 100 to 40 percent, left India. Taking this a signal more companies left India thereafter and the net position was that by 1981 the number of foreign companies operating in India had fallen to 300.
In 1980 Mrs Indira Gandhi had returned to power, chastened, and put forward a program of reforms. While nowhere was it mentioned that reforms were to be launched, several policies that were dysfunctional were rectified. For example, the ratification of surplus capacity as part of actual capacity commenced. No radical departures from existing policy mind-sets were forthcoming, but the need to use existing capacity in place was well-recognized and 1982 declared a Productivity Year. Also, product development was thought to be a significant area for industries. In their abilities to introduce new products, at competitive costs, industries would need to show their mettle. However, to do so needed the articulation of policies encouraging adoption of new foreign technologies and the establishment of plants with globally-competitive scale parameters, as opposed to fragmentation of capacity among numerous firms.
That empirical reality was being recognized, and evidence that a change of heart was taking place, is reflected in a statement in the seventh-plan document: that the approach of government bodies lay "not in the extensive powers to control and regulate, but in their efforts to provide technical and administrative guidance to industries. The performance of these tasks will be informed less by legal or procedural codes but by better access to data and knowledge" (Government of India, Seventh Five Year Plan, 1985: 7.42 ).
What is visible from figure 1 is that after the early 1980s, the numbers of foreign companies operating in India have started rising again. The growth becomes most pronounced after 1991, when full freedom of entry and exit was given to companies, and ownership restrictions, other than in a few select industries such as real estate, media and telecommunications among others, were removed. The numbers of foreign companies have increased substantially from the mid-1990s, and by 2001-02 there were over 1,100 foreign companies operation in India. Particularly, large jumps in the numbers started taking place after FERA was transformed into the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) in 1995. The change from FERA to FEMA was a significantly symbolic act that has sent a signal about the Indian government's intentions. Figure 1 shows that the number of government companies have steadily increased, from a low number of 74 in 1957-58 to 1,266 in 2001-02. The maximum upsurge in their numbers took place between the late 1960s and the late 1970s. This is when the socialist approach to economic management was given full rein. The number of government companies overtook the number of foreign companies in India in 1975-76 , and this phenomenon is totally consistent with the political economy of India. By 1990, the gap between the numbers of foreign and government companies was the largest. The growth in numbers of government companies has, however, started tapering off in the 21 st century, and there is every indication that, given the rate of growth in numbers, foreign companies may outstrip the number of government companies in India within the current decade. Figure 2 shows the numbers of domestic private companies operating in India. It is shown separately from the figure for foreign and government companies so as to handle scale issues within and between the two figures. *********************** INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE *********************** From the 1950s till the late 1970s, there were less than 50,000 domestic private companies operating in India. The curve is quite horizontal during this phase. As I have remarked earlier, in the early 1980s there was a change of heart, subtle and unannounced though it might have been, reflecting a desire to encourage private industry. From the 1980s, the number of domestic private companies operating in India has increased very substantially. The curve inclines more towards the vertical from the early 1990s onwards, reflecting the profound sense of entrepreneurship that is apparent in India after the liberalization of 1991. By 2001-02 there were over 550,000 domestic companies operating in India. Nevertheless, domestic private companies in India are of considerably smaller size than the foreign and government companies that operate in India. India's industrial economy can be characterized as being large scale in the foreign and government sectors while it is of small and medium scale in the domestic sector. This issue, of scale, is not explicitly addressed in this article but is a topic that ought to be addressed in future analysis.
Assessing Growth Rates of the Different Types of Firms
Two additional analyses are carried out and reported. Table 2 provides the growth rates for two variables. These are, first, the change in the number of the different types of companies, and second, the change in the proportion that each type of company bears to the total number of companies. The first is an absolute measure. The second is a relative measure that captures the importance of each type of company within the overall number of companies, though in this article it is not possible to evaluate the relative importance in terms of sales or output generated or in terms of capital invested. Such an analysis is left for future work since it does require more detailed data that has to be acquired. Table 3 contains a correlation matrix between the numbers of foreign, domestic private and government companies and the proportions of foreign, private and government companies. *********************** INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE *********************** Panel A of table 2 displays the annual percentage growth rates and while foreign firms have grown by an average of just under 2 percent in number, the numbers of domestic and government firms in India have grown at over 7 percent, on average, in the entire period. There has been substantial variation in the growth of the number of foreign firms, as also shown in figure 1, while the numerical growth of private domestic and government companies, or firms, has been steady and with limited comparative variation. This is prima-facie indication of an ambivalent, and perhaps even hostile, attitude that has been displayed towards foreign firms operating in India.
Panel B of table 2 displays the annual percentage growth rates in the proportions that each type of company bears to the total number of companies operating within India. This is an important statistic as it shows the relative rise or decline in importance of each type of company. Again, within the period of five decades as a whole the role of foreign firms has diminished substantially within India and there is decline, or negative growth, of over 4.6 percent on average in the proportion of foreign firms to the total number of firms in India. The proportion of private domestic firms to the total number of firms has not changed materially; on average it rises at the rate of 0.13 percent per annum and this category of company, while growing steadily, has retained its relative position in numbers within the total population of Indian firms. Correspondingly, the proportion of government firms to the total number of firms has changed more substantially, rising on average at 0.36 percent per annum, during the entire period. These statistics are not at all surprising, given the anti-foreign and pro-government firm attitude that was prevalent for much of the period evaluated.
I dwell briefly on two interesting patterns shown in the correlation matrix in table 3. First, the growth in the number of government firms in India is negatively correlated with the number of foreign (-0.405) firms and domestic private firms (-0.441) in India. This is an indication that the growth in numbers of government firms has crowded out both domestic private and foreign firms from Indian industry, and, while this is not at all a surprising finding, given the political economy behind India's industrial policy, the correlations coefficients are not insubstantial. Second, the growth in the proportion of foreign firms is negatively correlated with the growth of domestic private firms (0.768). While private domestic firms can also crowd out other forms of firms and other types of capital from industry, this statistic indicates more of resurgence in private domestic industrial activity such that the relative role of private domestic firms is increasing, and eventually private domestic capital is becoming the dominant feature in Indian industry.
The year-by-year detailed numbers that make up the summary statistics as presented in table 2 and discussed in sub-section 3.3 are graphically displayed in figures 3 and 4. Additionally, statistical tests are run on these numbers to evaluate whether the trends are significant or not. I first briefly discuss the trends as shown in figures 3 and 4. *********************** INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE *********************** The figures show the growth rates in the number of foreign, domestic private and government companies and their proportions plotted over time. Three trends are visible from figure 3. First, the growth in the numbers of foreign firms was low, and in many case negative, till the late 1970s. In fact, the rates of decline from the late 1970s to the early 1980s were very substantial, for reasons that have been discussed earlier, but since then have been positive. In the 1990s, these growth rates are increasing. In the post liberalization period, the number of foreign companies operating in India has risen, on average, by almost 8.5 percent annually. In other words, foreign firms do seem to want to do business in India.
Second, the growth rates in the number of domestic private firms were initially negative till the early 1960s. Recollect that from the mid to late 1950s the commanding heights doctrine led to the establishment of several government enterprises. This phenomenon did crowd out private enterprise, but since the 1960s the growth rates have been positive. In fact, from the late 1970s onwards, notwithstanding the socialist economy doctrine perpetrated by the government, the growth rates have been very substantial. From 1981 till the late 1990s, the growth rates have been in the double digits and only slowed down somewhat in the 21 st century. On the other hand, the base of firms has increased so much numerically that the annual number of new companies being established is still very substantial. In the post-liberalization period the number of domestic companies operating in India has grown by almost 10 per cent per annum on average.
Third, government companies grew in number very substantially from the 1950s till the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their growth rate has substantially shrunk since then, and in the period after 1991 the number of government companies has increased at an annual average rate of 0.79. The fact that this growth rate is not negative is, of course, a source of curiosity since the growth rates are expected to become negative as privatization proceeds and the number of government firms reduce. While this article does not deal with the privatization issue as such, the finding is an indication of the lack of any success in privatization efforts in India. In fact, it is quite the opposite since the number of government companies have increased, albeit quite marginally. *********************** INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE *********************** Figure 4 displays the annual trends in the growth rate of the proportions that the different types or kinds of companies have to the total number of companies operating in India. Foreign companies lost their relative standing in Indian industry by the 1960s, a fact also observed by Kidron (1965) , and till the mid 1990s kept on losing it, albeit the pace of such loss was not so accelerated in the 1980s as it had been in the 1970s. It is only after the mid 1990s that their relative presence in Indian industry has started increasing. Correspondingly, the change in the relative presence of domestic private firms in Indian industry has been almost negligible. The growth in the number of companies overall is mainly driven by an increase in the number of private companies, and the relative presence of the private sector has, therefore, remained constant.
On the other hand, the role of government companies in India became pronounced since the mid 1950s and this is reflected in figure 4. The growth rates in the relative proportion of government companies to the total number of companies were positive till the late 1970s and since then have turned negative. This trend is quite consistent with the growth in numbers of private companies from that time onwards, which was encouraged by the government, and the implicit transfer of resources away from the public sector to encourage such growth. Consequently, a negative growth rate in the relative role of government companies is a quite logical outcome. While many privatizations have not taken place in India, and the number of government companies is actually marginally increasing, clearly the role of state firms' relative presence in industry overall has diminished. The figure, thus, shows the decline of the role of government firms in India and this has been supplanted by a rise in the role of foreign and private firms in the economy.
Statistical Evaluation of the Growth Rates of the Different Types of Firms
Next, each variable, the number of foreign, domestic private and government companies and their proportions, is regressed on two independent variables: a time index and the squared value of the time index. These regressions permit a statistical evaluation of the significance of the growth rates of these variables. The equation is of the general form: ∆ = α + βt + δt 2 + µt. The symbol ∆ denotes the percentage growth rate or change for each of the six variables and t is the time index. A significantly positive value of δ indicates an acceleration in the pace of change; a significantly negative value indicates deceleration.
The inclusion of time squared on the right-hand side introduces a multi-collinearity problem. This is solved by normalizing time in mean deviation form. That is, it is set to zero on the mid-point of the time series. This normalization makes time and its square orthogonal. The normalization of time only affects β. The estimate of δ and its standard error are invariant with respect to the normalization. In the log-quadratic estimation, the value of β is the same as in the log-linear model.
The standard error of β is the measure of instability of the growth rate of efficiency. If it is assumed that the log-quadratic form is a better estimator of the true trends in the growth rate of efficiency, the instability measure of β is also improved, since systematic specification errors are cleansed from the data. The results are given in table 4. *********************** INSERT TABLE 4 HERE *********************** Table 4 shows that all of the variables are statistically significant at the usual levels. There has been significant acceleration in the growth in numbers of foreign and domestic private companies in India, and a significant deceleration in the growth in the number of government companies. Similarly, there has been a significant acceleration in the growth in the proportions of foreign and domestic private companies within Indian industry, and a significant deceleration in the proportion of government companies. These results provide statistical support for all the other trends that have been described and discussed so far.
ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
The evidence reveals a fairly complex pattern of foreign firm dynamics. Foreign firms, which were once prominent in India before independence, became an extremely limited part of India's economy but since 1991 are entering India in large numbers. So what? What has been the impact of their presence on India's industrial performance over the entire time period being studied? These are important questions going to very heart of the issues as to how India's industrial structure has evolved so far, and will evolve in the future. In a sense, the raison d'etre of this article is to evaluate the long run relationships between the presence, whether increasing or decreasing, of foreign firms in the Indian economy and the productivity of its industrial sector; this section describes the analysis carried out in this respect.
Data from the DCA on the growth of the corporate sector are next matched to ASI data to evaluate these questions. For the period 1957-58 to 2001-02, data generated by the ASI in India are used to calculate a measure of industrial performance and competitiveness, which is expressed as relative productive efficiency. Variations in the measure of productive efficiency are then explained using the growth in the numbers and proportions of the various types of companies as independent variables within the framework of time series regressions. The ASI data relate to the organized sector of manufacturing industry and have seen prior use (Majumdar, 1996) . See the appendix for more details.
The ASI data relate to the organized sector of manufacturing industry and have seen prior use. The factory sector summary is used as the data-source for this study. From the data set, labor and capital inputs as well as output measures can be identified. The advantage of using this data is that information for the entire Indian industry is available. The characteristic of this particular database is that data are aggregate because of the reporting policies of the Department of Statistics of the Government of India. However, the aggregation issue is unavoidable since information on a key variable, on firm-level employment, is not available for private sector firms from any source whatsoever, particularly for over a long time series. In fact, the availability of employment data is one of the unique strengths of the ASI system. Hence, any comparative study of efficiency and performance has to use a data-base such as this. Aggregate data also helps avoid any sample-selection biases, since data on the entire industrial population is considered for comparative efficiency assessment purposes.
The ASI coverage and the almost five decades of time-series data yield rich information on the entire population of enterprises that make up the organized industrial sector of India, and the data generated by the ASI constitute the most crucial component of industrial statistics in India. According to the Department of Statistics, the industrial sector is broadly classified into the organized and unorganized sectors. These institutional categories are found in all the three major groups of industries, namely, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity generation, transmission and distribution. The ASI covers organized segments of last two groups and excludes mining and quarrying from its purview. Services and activities such as cold storage, water supply and repair of motor vehicles and of other durable goods are also covered under the survey, as they are incidental to manufacturing process.
The ASI does not cover the unorganized or unregistered manufacturing sector of Indian industry. The ASI, however, covers all factories registered under sections 2 m (i) and 2 m (ii) of the Factories Act 1948, which are factories employing 10 or more workers with the aid of power and those employing 20 or more workers without the aid of power, respectively, on any day of the preceding 12 months. The ASI frame of reference is based on the list of registered factories maintained by the Chief Inspector of Factories (CIF) in each state, and those maintained by licensing authorities for indigenous tobacco and cigar establishments and electricity undertakings. The ASI frame gets revised from time to time by deletion of de-registered factories and inclusion of newly registered ones. Initially, the ASI was being revised once every two tears until 1981 -82. Between 1982 -83 and 1988 , the frame was revised once in four years. From 1989-90 onwards, the frame is revised once in three years. But new registrations are added in the existing frame every year, and the regional offices of the Field Operations Directorate (FOD) of the CSO, which keep close liaison with the offices of CIF in the states, update the frame every year.
Variables for Calculating Efficiency
In the calculation of the relative productive efficiency parameters four inputs and one output are used in the computation of a productive efficiency index for each observation. The inputs are: deflated rupee values of fixed capital, deflated working capital, actual number of workers employed, and the actual number of managerial staff employed. To create value necessitates acquisition and configuration of capabilities, which are encapsulated in physical, liquid and human capital. Capital inputs, both physical and working capital, are expressed in crores of rupees. Human capital inputs are expressed in thousands of employees. Fixed capital covers, apart from plant and machinery, all other types of assets deployed for production, transportation, living or recreational facilities, hospitals and schools for factory personnel; it includes assets of the owning enterprise's head office allocable to the factory and also full value of the assets taken on hire-purchase basis excluding the interest element; it excludes intangible assets solely used for post-manufacturing activities such as sale, storage and distribution.
The output variable used is net value added, also expressed in crores of rupees, which is a standard measure of firm-level output. In the literature on efficiency measurement both value added and gross output are used to measure output. However, Griliches and Ringstad (1971) advance arguments in favor of using value added because it facilitates comparison of results for firms which may be heterogeneous in material consumption. Second, inclusion of material as an input may lead to the problem that all variation in efficiency may be captured by materials consumption, thus obscuring the role of physical and human capital utilization.
A further choice arises between the uses of either gross or net value added as the output measure. Denison (1974) makes a case for the use of net value added on theoretical grounds by arguing that, since gross value added includes a measure of capital consumption, there is no rationale as to why capital consumption ought to be maximized rather than minimized. Nevertheless, value added captures hybrid aspects of firms' activities. First, it captures a production relationship between primary factors and output. This relationship is based on managements' capabilities. Second, it also captures a profit-generating relationship between firm-specific capital and firms' output, which, while also dependent on endogenous management capabilities, is highly dependent on exogenous demand and supply conditions.
Estimation of Efficiency
I use data envelopment analysis (DEA) for estimation purposes. An extensive literature has evolved on the topic of DEA (see Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford, 1994) . I do not go into much detail other than to state that the algorithm used for analysis in Majumdar (1996) is also used in this evaluation. Using observed output and input data, and without making any assumptions as to the nature of underlying technology or functional form, the DEA algorithm calculates an ex-post measure of the comparative efficiency of each observation. This is accomplished by constructing an empirically-based frontier, and by evaluating each observation against all others in the data set.
DEA optimizes for each individual observation, in place of the overall aggregation and single optimization performed in statistical regressions. Instead of trying to fit a regression plane through the center of the data, DEA floats a piece-wise linear surface to rest on top of observations. This is empirically-driven by data, rather than by assumptions as to functional forms. The only assumption made is that the piece-wise linear envelopment surface is convex. Next, the efficiency score is a bounded efficiency measure, and any observation with a score of less than 1 has measurable potential for improvement. This is an important quality, as relative performance differences between observations can be easily understood.
Analysis of the Efficiency Patterns
The annual efficiency parameters calculated are displayed in figure 5. The descriptive statistics for the efficiency parameters that have been calculated are given in table 5. I first discuss the pattern of the annual efficiency scores and then discuss the statistics. A reiteration of what the efficiency scores mean is in order. These are comparative efficiency scores evaluating the relative productive efficiency of each observation against all other observations. The efficiency for each year is evaluated against all other years and the results display the comparative efficiency position. *********************** INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE *********************** The figure shows that the efficiency scores for the first part of the overall period were at 1; in other words, these years were the frontier definers. The scores of 1 are observed for the years 1957-58 to 1961-62. After that period efficiency in Indian industry plummeted. There are two possible explanations. One is the impact of the commanding heights policy regime, put into place in the mid to late 1950s, which was having a lagged impact on performance. The second is that this period was the aftermath of India's 1962 China war, a very difficult foreign exchange situation arose and a deteriorating agricultural situation led to a decline in effective demand.
Productive efficiency continued to plummet till the early 1970s. By that time Indian industry was just three fourths as efficient as it had been less than a decade ago. There was a rising efficiency trend thereafter, but even by the early 1980s productive efficiency was just 85 percent of what it had been in the late 1950s. The major catch up with the past commenced in the early 1980s, and was achieved in the 1990s. This trend has also been noted elsewhere (Ahluwalia, 1985; Majumdar, 1996) . Thus, the productive efficiency picture for India over 5 decades is almost U-shaped, in its simplest representation, and the temporal pattern is stationary. I discuss the statistics given in table 5. *********************** INSERT TABLE 5 HERE *********************** The overall average efficiency score for the entire period, 1957-58 to 2001-02, is 0.896. I divide up the period into four phases or sub-periods, reflecting the mind-sets and attitudes that prevailed in each of those periods, and discuss the efficiency scores relevant for that period. The first phase is from 1957-58 to 1971-72. This is the period between the commencement of the commanding heights economy and before the commencement of the FERA period in 1973. During this period the average efficiency score was 0. 854. The variations in efficiency were also the largest in this period. In the next period, which is from 1973-74 to 1979-80, the average efficiency score was 0.867. This is the period after FERA commenced in 1973 and before the commencement of any sort of reforms. In the mid to late 1970s there was also a period when civil liberties were put on hold and the party that had ruled from independence lost its power. The average scores for both of these periods are much less than the average score for the overall period.
The early 1980s is when withdrawal of some of the more draconian and egregious policies commenced, with the government desiring to promote private enterprise in a substantial way. There are two sub-periods. One of these is from 1980-81 to 1990-91. This is a phase when enlightenment dawned till the foreign exchange crisis of 1991 brought about a complete change in the mind set. During this particular period the government of Mrs Indira Gandhi attempted reforms by stealth and the successor government of Rajiv Gandhi attempted reforms with reluctance (Bhagwati, 1993) . The average efficiency score during this period is 0.904, reflecting productive efficiency growth and a catch up with the past. The final period is from 1991-92, after reforms commenced, till 2001-02. The average efficiency score for this sub-period is 0.964, reflecting a considerable growth in productive efficiency in Indian industry after the commencement of the reforms. In addition, the variations in efficiency during this period are the least of any of the four sub-periods.
Time Series Regression Analysis of the Data
To evaluate the long run relationship between the presence of foreign firms in India and productive efficiency of Indian industry, while controlling for the presence of private domestic firms as well as government firms, I estimate a series of time series regressions in which the dependent variable is the annual productive efficiency score and the explanatory variables are the changes in the numbers and proportions of the different types of companies. This approach is predicated by the estimates of an ARIMA model which suggests non-stationarity in the explanatory variables.
I initially estimate OLS regressions for two sets of models; the first set is where the explanatory variables are the changes in the numbers of the various types of companies, foreign, private domestic and government; the second is where the explanatory variables are the changes in the proportions of the various types of companies. The dependent variable is productive efficiency over time and the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests (Engle, 1982) reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Thereafter, I estimate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models (Bollerlsev, 1986) to evaluate the long run relationship between productive efficiency and changes in the presence of foreign firms in India. The results of these estimations are provided in table 6. *********************** INSERT TABLE 6 HERE *********************** There are two panels in table 6. The first panel, panel A, presents results where the explanatory variables are the growth, or change, in the numbers of each type of company, foreign, domestic private or government. The second panel, panel B, presents results where the explanatory variables are the growth, or change, in the proportions of each type of company, foreign, domestic private or government. The first column shows that the growth in the number of foreign firms operating in India is significantly (p < 0.001) and positively associated with the productive efficiency in the long run.
When the growth in the number of government companies is introduced as a control, the results stays robust. The growth in the number of government companies is, however, negatively and significantly associated with the long run productive efficiency of Indian industry. This is not an unexpected result given the widespread view that, in general, government firms are less superior in performance to private firms, whether these private firms are of domestic or foreign origin. When the growth in the number of domestic private firms is also introduced as a control variable, the results stay robust. There remains a positive long run relationship between the growing presence of foreign firms in India and a negative long run relationship with a growing presence of government firms. The variable for the private firms is also positive and significant, implying that there is a dynamic productivity effect of domestic entrepreneurship in Indian industry.
In panel B, the explanatory variables are now the changes in the relative proportions of the different types of firms. The first column shows that growth in the presence of foreign firms within Indian industry is, again, positively and significantly (p < 0.001) related to long run productive efficiency. In fact, the estimated coefficient and standard errors stay almost the same as in the previous regression models. When growth in the proportion of government companies is also introduced as a variable, the results stay robust and growth in government ownership still remains negatively related with long run productive efficiency. When the growth in the proportion of domestic private firms is factored in, the other results stay robust but the proportion of private firms' variable is now insignificant. Hence, the result for the domestic private sector is not as strong as that for the foreign sector. Thus, across a number of models the relationship between long run productive efficiency and growth in either the number or proportion of foreign firms in India is strongly positive.
The Relationships between Types of Firms and Competencies
A second set of analyses involves relating the growth in the numbers of the various types of companies to measures capturing latent capabilities in the utilization of the different types of inputs that are consumed by Indian industry. The DEA algorithm generates for each observation the virtual input values for each of the four inputs. This is the optimal proportion of an input that should have been consumed to have generated the output value associated with that observation (Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seifird, 1994) . Variations across time, if any, in each of these virtual input proportions are assessed to evaluate if these are explained by variations in the growth of the different categories of companies.
These virtual input proportions implicitly and numerically capture differences in capability sets, and this analysis examines associations between differences in capability sets and growth in the different types of companies. In fact, the fundamental premise is that foreign firms possess certain intangibles assets and skills that are responsible for their superior performance. This analysis permits a granular assessment of the relationships between the different varieties of the latent capability sets that the different types of companies are presumed to possess and the finer performance measures generated by the DEA program.
Four of these measures are generated. They are, first, a physical capital utilization measure, a working capital and liquid assets utilization measure, a workers utilization measure, and finally, a managerial human capital utilization measure. Each of these measures is used as a dependent variable in an OLS regression model and the regression diagnostics are evaluated. The autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests do not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity for the physical capital utilization measure, and the working capital and liquid assets utilization measure where the explanatory variables are the growth in the numbers of different types of companies. Thus, the OLS results are presented in table 7. However, the ARCH tests reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity for the workers utilization measure and the managerial human capital utilization measure. Thereafter, I estimate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models for these two variables with the explanatory variables being the growth in the numbers of different types of companies. The GARCH estimates are also provided in table 7. *********************** INSERT TABLE 7 HERE *********************** Each of the four dependent variables measures a specific latent capability. The evidence generated as to how the growth in the numbers of the different types of companies relates to these variables is also unique. The results in table 7 are ordered by dependent variable, with the first two columns containing the results for the physical capital utilization measure, and the next several columns containing the results for the working capital and liquid assets utilization measure, the workers utilization measure and the managerial human capital utilization measure respectively. I review the results in table 7 horizontally across for the purposes of interpretation. I only review the results that are significant.
The increasing number of foreign firms is associated negatively with the physical capital utilization and the workers utilization measures, while it is significantly and positively related to the measure for managerial human capital utilization. Growth in domestic firms' numbers is positively related to the physical capital utilization measure but negatively to all the other measures, while growth in the numbers of government firms is negatively related to the workers utilization measure and the measure for managerial human capital utilization.
These results do provide support for the intangible assets rationale underlying foreign firms' expansion overseas, in that an increase in foreign firms' presence in Indian industry is associated with an increasing ability of industry to utilize its managerial human capital more effectively. Managerial human capital embodies the high value-adding tacit capital that generates relatively superior performance. Such knowledge relates to managing processes and networks effectively, among other things. On the other hand, till very recently foreign firms have, by and large, have entered India via collaborations with other Indian partners, possibly because India has been a difficult country to manage several other activities in. Such difficulties may account for the negative relationship found for the physical capital utilization and the workers utilization measures.
ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS
The results show that a strong long run relationship exists between the growing presence of foreign firms in India and the productive efficiency of Indian industry as a whole. Therefore, the notion that foreign firms' capabilities can spillover to other sectors of industry does find support in the overall data. Hence, the primary conclusion is that past efforts to limit the presence of foreign firms in India was short-sighted, to say the least. Even more short-sighted was the encouragement of the growth of government firms within Indian industry. Their growing presence, because of a crowding out effect, has had a deleterious effect as revealed by the long run negative relationship between the growth of government firms and productive efficiency for Indian industry as a whole. While privatization is a favored solution to deal with government firms, in India it has hardly taken place. One option is to let the government firms eventually wither on the vine. Nevertheless, a detailed statement of what is to be done with the public sector is outside the scope of this paper.
Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that encouraging the growth of foreign firms in India, via the encouragement of foreign direct investment, is a critical policy contingency to be implemented. Foreign firms, relative to domestic private firms, and most certainly relative to government firms, have a significant positive impact on India's industrial performance. Yet, even though the presence of foreign firms and foreign direct investment is growing in India, the relative proportion of foreign firms to the total number of firms is very small. In table 8 I list the number of foreign firms, the proportion of foreign firms to the total number of firms, the growth rates in the number of firms and the growth rates in the proportion of foreign firms to the total for the period after 1991. These are some of the basic data that have already been analyzed. *********************** INSERT TABLE 8 HERE *********************** First, the number of foreign firms in India has increased very substantially in the decade or so for which the data are presented in table 7. The proportion for foreign firms to the total number of firms has, however, dropped. This is, no doubt, because of the extraordinary unleashing of domestic private entrepreneurial activity in India, as a consequence of which the number of private firms being established is increasing at a substantial rate as all the evidence indicates. Thus, the number of domestic private firms tends to overwhelm the number of foreign firms. Nevertheless, since the superior technological and other capabilities hypothesis associated with foreign firms is shown to be valid by the analysis, there are further substantial latent productivity gains to be made by Indian industry if the number of foreign firms operating in India does increase.
On this score, table 7 does show that the growth in the number of foreign firms in India has been large in the period after 1991. In fact, the growth in numbers averages 8.5 percent for the period from 1991-92 to 2001-02, but the growth since 1995-96 has been at over 10 percent per year. Even the proportion of foreign firms to the total number of firms, while it has dropped from 1991-92 to 1996-97, shows a positive growth in the period from 1997-98 onwards. Some of this decline was due to the resurgence of private domestic entrepreneurial activity in India. Yet, the positive growth in the proportions after the mid-1990s portends an interest in India by the suppliers of foreign capital. Thus, foreign firms are becoming an increasing presence in the Indian economy.
The Importance of Property Rights
So what is right and what is still not right? The ambiguousness and ambivalence that India has displayed towards foreign investment, especially from the early 1970s onwards, has been replaced by a change of spirit. Or has it? The first important property rights policy change was the automatic approval for foreign firms to hold 51 percent ownership. Hitherto, foreign firms could hold up to 40 percent shares and the permission to hold 51 percent was given, quite grudgingly, in a few cases. Earlier work (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999) has highlighted that only when foreign firms have 51 percent ownership do Indian companies display superior profitability. This is explained by the notion that superior performance is a function of the superior capabilities that foreign firms possess and which they will be loath to transfer to India unless they hold majority ownership in Indian companies. Thus, the automatic availability of property rights has been a major change that affects the incentives of foreign firms to set up operations in India.
The second property rights related change has been the extension of automatic approvals for having ownership stakes of up to 74 percent in all but a few sectors such as media and telecommunications. This took place in 1997. As a consequence, in 1997-98 the number of foreign firms operating in India grew by over 13 percent, and it was in this year too that a positive growth in the proportion of foreign firms to the total number of firms was noted. Thus, basic property rights changes have had significant effects on providing incentives for foreign firms to operate in India. Yet, policy pronouncements have to be consistent so that encouragement for entry is material.
Loss of Nerve and Policy Inconsistency
A policy paradox has also been perpetrated, one with unfortunate consequences. The various policy measures on liberalization have been influenced by Indian entrepreneurs. For a long time, during the period of the closed economy, they had virtual monopolies under the licensing system. Previously, government had decided on the entry of foreign firms into India and the maximum shareholding they could hold. Such discretion was taken away by allowing automatic entry, yet simultaneously the Indian government managed to give the veto rights to the Indian private sector on certain aspects of foreign firms' entry into India by promulgating Press Note 18 in late 1998.
At the time of the note, a coalition government had taken power. One of its constituents planks was that of Swadeshi, an expression evoking purely domestic industry. A crisis of confidence among Indian entrepreneurs could have arisen since a large body of firms had gotten used to operating within a closed system with no competition. As a result, there were pressures to have this note promulgated. This seems surprising given that private domestic firms were being established in large numbers after 1991. Conversely, the pro-protection lobby, called the Bombay Group (Das, 2002) , could have had it ways implemented by appealing to the Swadeshi lobby which would then have organized the issue of Press Note 18. Nevertheless, this note signaled significant inconsistencies on the part of the government which simultaneously sought to encourage foreign investment and then control its disposition.
According to Press Note 18, if foreign investors planning entry had a previous joint venture, technology transfer or trade mark agreement in the same or related field in India, they could not use the automatic route for a new joint venture or technology transfer agreement and would have to apply specifically for new investment in another enterprise. Thus further de novo enterprises could be established but additional collaborations could not be entered into with other partners. Second, the foreign investor would have to justify to the Foreign Investment Promotion Board how the new proposal would not jeopardize the interests of the existing joint venture or technology partner.
The psychological implications of this pronouncement are quite profound. A signal easily sent is that the Indian partners were lacking confidence and wanted to retain control rights, using the government as a proxy to decide how foreign firms could conduct their business strategies in India. The note also caused concern among foreign investors, since it put substantial power in the hands of Indian private sector industrialists, who already had relationships with foreign companies, in that they could effectively prevent foreign investors coming into India even if their own joint venture were not doing well. It is difficult to speculate on the precise numbers of foreign companies scared off by this note, but given that India's annual FDI levels have been comparatively low, in financial terms, the number could be quite large. The note has been repealed in early 2005, showing a recovery of nerve on part of the government. Nevertheless, the impact is likely to have been of some consequence. Subsequent analysis and research can evaluate the impact of this press note on retarding FDI into India between 1999 and 2005.
CONCLUSION
In this article I evaluate whether the changing presence of foreign firms in the corporate sector has had an impact on the long-run economic performance of India's industry. To do so, I trace the patterns of corporate demography in India from the 1950s to the 2000s using data from the Department of Company Affairs (DCA) of the Government of India that covers the numbers of the various types of companies making up India's corporate sector. To measure performance I calculate productive efficiency indices for all of Indian industry using a data base put together by the Central Statistical Organization as the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The DCA and ASI data cover the period from 1957-58 to 2001-02 and permit an economy-wide analysis for a period of five decades.
There are three findings. The results show a strong relationship between the growing presence of foreign firms in India and productive efficiency of industry, and the notion that foreign firms' capabilities can spillover to other sectors of industry finds support. Past efforts to limit the presence of foreign firms in India were short-sighted, and even more short-sighted was the support given towards encouraging the growth of government firms within Indian industry. Their growing presence was associated with a strong long run negative relationship with productive efficiency for Indian industry as a whole. Finally, an increase in foreign firms' presence is also associated with an enhancement of the ability of Indian industry to utilize its managerial human capital effectively.
In the period after reforms commenced in 1991, the number of foreign firms in India has increased very substantially. The growth in numbers averages 8.5 percent for the period from 1991-92 to 2001-02 and since 1995-96 has been at over 10 percent per year. While the proportion for foreign firms to the total number of firms dropped, no doubt because of the unleashing of domestic private entrepreneurial activity in India, this statistic shows a positive growth in the period from 1997-98 onwards. This positive growth in the proportions after the mid-1990s portends a significant interest in India by the suppliers of foreign capital. Thus, foreign firms are interested in becoming an increasing presence in the Indian economy, with positive performance consequences expected from such increased participation.
So far basic property rights changes have had significant effects on providing incentives for foreign firms to operate in India and the automatic availability of such rights has been a major factor affecting the motivation of foreign firms to operate in India. Yet, policy pronouncements have not been consistent. The Indian government also gave veto rights to the Indian private sector on certain aspects of foreign firm entry into India by promulgating Press Note 18 in late 1998. It is difficult to speculate on the precise numbers of foreign companies that were scared off by this note. The note has just been repealed in early 2005, yet other roadblocks remain. Future research is necessary to evaluate the impact that Press Note 18 might have had on retarding the growth in the number of foreign firms in India, and thereby its long-run industrial performance.
Appendix: All India Survey of Industries
The history of industrial statistics in India unfolds as follows. Though the first Factories Act was enacted in India n 1881 and revised in 1891, 1911, 1922 and 1934 The SSMI also continued up to 1958. All the reports from the manufacturing census from 1946 to 1958 were published. Although the CMI covered factories employing 20 or more workers using power in any manufacturing process, there has been year-to-year variation in the geographic area covered and the response rate. The CMI published information on capital (fixed capital, working capital and depreciation), employment (workers and persons other than workers), man-hours, payment to each category of employees along with the value of benefits and privileges, inputs (fuels, materials and total), the value of output of products and by-products and net value added. The ASI data relate to the organized sector of manufacturing industry and have seen prior use. The factory sector summary is used as the data-source for this study. From the data set, labor and capital inputs as well as output measures can be identified. The advantage of using this data is that information for the entire Indian industry is available. This includes information on firms owned by the governments of the various states in the Indian Union which are also substantial players in the industrial arena, and whose performance has been empirically analyzed in only a limited way. In particular, the enterprises owned by the state governments run substantial operations in the field of transport services and power generation, though they also undertake an extraordinarily large variety of other activities. Joint sector enterprises have a particular presence in the field of hydrocarbons, which is a sector of economic importance to the country and where government presence in ownership was sought to be attained for the purposes of ensuring economic security.
The characteristic of this particular data-base is that data are aggregate because of the reporting policies of the Department of Statistics of the Government of India. However, the aggregation issue is unavoidable since information on a key variable, on firm-level employment, is just not available for private sector firms from any source whatsoever. In fact, the availability of employment data is one of the unique strengths of the ASI system. Hence, any comparative study of efficiency and performance has to use a data-base such as this. Aggregate data also helps avoid any sample-selection biases, since data on the entire industrial population is considered for comparative efficiency assessment purposes.
The ASI coverage and the over two decades of time-series data yield rich information on the entire population of enterprises that make up the organized industrial sector of India, and the data generated by the ASI constitute the most crucial component of industrial statistics in India. According to the Department of Statistics, the industrial sector is broadly classified into organized and unorganized sector. These institutional categories are found in all the three major groups of industries, namely, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity generation, transmission and distribution. The ASI covers organized segments of the last two groups and excludes mining and quarrying from its purview.
Services and activities such as cold storage, water supply and repair of motor vehicles and of other durable goods are also covered under the survey, as they are incidental to manufacturing process. Some other servicing industries like motion picture production, personal services like laundry services and job dyeing are also covered under the survey, though their data are not tabulated as these industries do not fall under the scope of industrial sector as defined by the United Nations. Defense establishments, oil storage and distribution depots, and services such as restaurants, hotels, cafes, computer service centers and technical training institutes are also excluded from the purview of the survey.
The ASI does not cover the unorganized or unregistered manufacturing sector of Indian industry. The ASI, however, covers all factories registered under sections 2 m (i) and 2 m (ii) of the Factories Act 1948, which are factories employing 10 or more workers with the aid of power and those employing 20 or more workers without the aid of power, respectively, on any day of the preceding 12 months. In 1973-74 a new and expanded system of National Industrial Classification was introduced by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), subsequent to the publication of the International Standard Industrial Classification in 1968 by the United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO). It resulted in a major overhauling of the classification system as from 1973-74. The data since that time period adhere to this industrial classification scheme. All concepts and definitions have been uniformly applied for over twenty five years.
The ASI frame of reference is based on the list of registered factories maintained by the Chief Inspector of Factories (CIF) in each state, and those maintained by licensing authorities for indigenous tobacco and cigar establishments and electricity undertakings. The ASI frame gets revised from time to time by deletion of de-registered factories and inclusion of newly registered ones. Initially, the ASI was being revised once every two years until 1981 -82. Between 1982 -83 and 1988 , the frame was revised once in four years. From 1989-90 onwards, the frame is revised once in three years. But new registrations are added in the existing frame every year, and the regional 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 025 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 Years Efficiency Score Log likelihood 52.13 53.24 53.37 *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
